The coordinated attacks on April 25 and 26 in Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal have reignited a long-suppressed debate in Mali’s security circles: is it time to open dialogue with jihadist factions? As the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate, and the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA)—a Tuareg rebel group—intensify joint offensives, researchers and analysts argue that a purely military strategy has reached its limits.
a rapidly escalating offensive
The wave of attacks, unprecedented in scale and coordination, has swept across northern and central Mali, targeting military outposts and government symbols in at least six cities, including areas near Bamako. For the first time, JNIM and the FLA have demonstrated a rare operational alliance, formed in late 2024 after the dissolution of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP). The FLA, which claims the independence of the Azawad region in northern Mali, has expanded its influence alongside the jihadist group’s growing territorial control.
The assaults have starkly exposed the Malian regime’s vulnerabilities. Neither the military junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian allies, Africa Corps, have managed to halt the armed groups’ advance. Regional media and diplomatic sources are increasingly floating the idea of negotiations with JNIM, amid Bamako’s growing isolation and the regional quagmire. However, the junta continues to reject any form of dialogue, insisting that ‘no discussions will take place with terrorist armed groups,’ despite the rapidly deteriorating security situation.
an alliance that sounds alarm bells
JNIM remains the driving force behind the jihadist surge in the Sahel, spanning Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. For the military juntas of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), who seized power pledging to restore security, the deadlock is tightening. Nearly a year after renewed attacks, jihadist operations have inched closer to the capital, marking a dangerous shift in strategy.
Since July 2025, jihadists have targeted gold mining sites and industrial zones in western Mali before shifting focus to the Bamako-Dakar corridor, strangling the capital’s supply chains.
Alain Antil, director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Center at Ifri
« What stands out this time isn’t just the scale of the operation, but the deliberate selection of targets. Kati and Bamako are the regime’s nerve center,» notes Héni Nsaibia from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). The death of Mali’s Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, in Kati—a stronghold of the junta—has further shaken the government, compounded by the loss of Kidal, a key victory touted as a turning point in late 2023.
a strategy of strangulation
Analysts observe a shift in JNIM’s tactics, moving beyond sheer violence to create economic and logistical pressure. « The group is attempting to impose a de facto blockade on Bamako, cutting off access to essential supplies and isolating the city,» explains Alain Antil. This long-term approach aims to weaken the state from within, exploiting internal fractures within the military and governance systems.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, a Sahel specialist, highlights this calculated strategy: « By avoiding strict enforcement of sharia as a precondition for peace, JNIM is signaling openness to dialogue. Their goal is to prolong the conflict until the state is forced to negotiate. » The rise of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) adds another layer of instability, as competing factions vie for territorial dominance.
the taboo of negotiation is fading
Officially, leaders of the AES refuse to entertain the idea of talks. « For the Sahel juntas, military force remains the only viable response. Political negotiation is off the table,» states Alain Antil. Yet, on the ground, the narrative is shifting. Reports indicate that state forces and their Russian allies have killed nearly 1,500 civilians between January 2024 and March 2025—five times the toll attributed to JNIM—according to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). This brutality fuels resentment and inadvertently aids jihadist recruitment.
States must embrace the ‘brave compromise.’
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel expert
As the military option falters, experts increasingly advocate for a hybrid approach. « A solely military response is a dead end. Combining force with political negotiations is essential to address the root causes of radicalization,» argues Alain Antil. Some of the JNIM’s grievances—corruption, resource access, and justice—could serve as a foundation for discussions, provided violence is not condoned.
Elyessa goes further, proposing a pragmatic integration of armed factions into the political process to expose their limitations. However, he underscores non-negotiable red lines: « The secular nature of the state and gender equality are absolute prerequisites. » With each passing offensive, the once-unthinkable idea of dialogue is morphing from heresy into a plausible political strategy. For many in Mali, the question is no longer *if* negotiations should occur, but how long Bamako can delay the inevitable.