The Sahel no longer dominates global headlines. While the world’s attention has been hijacked by crises elsewhere—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict in 2023, Rwanda-backed rebel offensives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the upheaval of U.S. institutions under a new administration—the Sahel’s deepening turmoil has slipped from view. Yet the region’s multiple crises have not abated; they have intensified.
Military regimes that seized power in recent years vowed to dismantle jihadist networks. Instead, extremist groups have expanded their reach, unleashing waves of violence against civilians in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—the three nations that formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. Today, the Sahel stands as the global epicenter of jihadist violence, with civilian casualties mounting and state control eroding.
Compounding the crisis is a sharp authoritarian turn. Democratic transitions have been indefinitely delayed, elections suspended, and dissent crushed. Press freedoms are under siege: journalists face censorship, exile, or worse, while civil society organizations endure harassment, arbitrary arrests, and even extrajudicial killings. The suppression of dissent has become a hallmark of governance in the AES, where regimes cling to power by silencing voices and controlling narratives.
the Sahel’s escalating security crisis
Ten years ago, the Sahel recorded the lowest death toll from violent extremism in Africa. By 2024, the situation had reversed catastrophically. The region now accounts for the highest number of jihadist fatalities globally, with deaths tripling since 2021 to reach 11,200. This staggering figure does not include the 2,430 civilians killed in 2024 by national security forces and their Russian allies, raising alarming questions about who poses the greater threat to Sahelian lives.
Civilian communities are caught in a deadly crossfire. In Mali, jihadist attacks surged after the UN’s MINUSMA peacekeeping mission withdrew in 2023. The resurgence of armed clashes with Tuareg separatists in northern regions, backed by Malian forces and Russian mercenaries, has further destabilized the country. In October 2023, government forces reclaimed Kidal, a rebel stronghold for a decade, yet the victory did little to shift the balance of power. A tactical alliance between the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the Azawad People (CSP-DPA) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM, Al-Qaeda affiliate) culminated in a devastating ambush on Wagner-linked forces in Tinzaouaten in July 2024, killing 40 Malian soldiers and 80 Russian mercenaries—their deadliest loss in the region.
By late 2024, jihadist groups had deepened their penetration across Mali. In September, the JNIM launched coordinated attacks on a gendarmerie school and a military airport in Bamako, killing over 70 security personnel and destroying the presidential aircraft. These high-profile strikes exposed the state’s inability to secure its territory while signaling a new strategic boldness. Notably, the attacks targeted only military assets, a calculated move to curry public sympathy—a stark contrast to the Islamic State in the Sahel, which governs through fear and indiscriminate violence.
Civilians are paying the heaviest price. In July 2024, a wedding massacre in the Mopti region claimed 40 lives. The following month, Malian airstrikes on the same area killed over 20 civilians in retaliation for the Tinzaouaten ambush. By February 2025, another attack on a military convoy escorting civilians near Gao left 50 dead. Despite these escalations, polls from 2024 reveal that Malians retain surprising confidence in their armed forces, clinging to the narrative of a “rising power” against insurgents.
Burkina Faso: state collapse and communal violence
Burkina Faso’s descent into chaos accelerated after the 2022 military coup. By 2024, the state had lost control of 60% of its territory, with the JNIM active in 11 of the country’s 13 regions. Independent observers confirm that jihadist groups move freely across the nation. The human toll is staggering: deaths surged by 68% between 2022 and 2023, with 2024 poised to surpass that grim record. The deadliest attack in Burkina Faso’s history unfolded in August 2024 in Barsalogho, where jihadists targeted civilians forced to dig trenches for the army, killing between 130 and 600 people.
Security forces, too, have been implicated in atrocities. In February 2024, Human Rights Watch documented the army’s summary execution of at least 223 civilians in two villages. Reports of mutilations and civilian massacres—including one in Solenzo where Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) allegedly killed dozens of Fulani civilians—have become commonplace. The VDP, officially a civilian militia, has been armed and deployed by the state since 2020, with recruitment intensifying after the 2022 coup. Captain Traoré’s regime recruited 50,000 additional VDP fighters in 2022, offering two weeks of training, weapons, and a monthly stipend of 300 euros. This strategy, however, has deepened ethnic tensions and fueled intercommunal violence. Villages hosting VDP members are now prime targets for jihadist reprisals, blurring the lines between state forces, militias, and armed groups.
Forced conscription of political opponents into VDP ranks and the use of militias as cannon fodder have further militarized Burkinabè society. The result is a spiraling humanitarian disaster: over 2 million internally displaced people, the highest displacement rate in the region.
Niger: fragile stability, growing lethality
Niger, once relatively insulated from jihadist violence compared to its AES neighbors, has seen a sharp rise in lethal attacks since the 2023 coup. Military operations intensified, but so did civilian casualties. Since the coup, state forces have killed three times as many civilians as in the previous year, placing populations between the hammer of extremist groups and the anvil of security forces.
A 2024 study by the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S⁴) initiative found that state forces faced 51 attacks in nine months—nearly double the 2023 figure. Non-state armed groups have grown bolder, targeting both civilians and security personnel. In March 2024, 23 soldiers died in an ambush near Tillabéri. By December, two attacks near the Burkina Faso border killed 39 civilians. In March 2025, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) massacred 44 worshippers in a mosque, underscoring the escalating brutality.
While Niger appears marginally more stable than its AES counterparts, the reality remains precarious: since July 2023, insecurity has steadily worsened.
authoritarian consolidation in the AES
The three AES states—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—share a common strategy: prolonging military rule under the guise of transition. Since their coups, each regime has extended transition timelines, rewritten constitutions, and systematically suppressed dissent to consolidate power.
In Mali, the 2020 coup initially set an 18-month transition with elections slated for February 2022. When these failed to materialize, a 24-month extension was negotiated with ECOWAS, pushing polls to February 2024. By late 2023, authorities cited “technical” reasons—including a census conducted by a French firm—to justify further delays. In May 2024, an inter-Malian dialogue recommended a two-to-five-year transition, allowing coup leader Colonel Goïta to remain in power until 2029. In October 2024, Goïta promoted himself to army general and elevated five junta members to the same rank, signaling an unmistakable grip on power. Though election talks resurfaced briefly in late 2024, they had vanished by early 2025.
Burkina Faso’s Captain Traoré initially promised elections for July 2024. By late 2023, however, the junta declared elections “non-priority,” later announcing constitutional reforms. In May 2024, the transition was extended to 60 months, allowing Traoré to stay in power until 2029—a move mirrored from Mali’s playbook.
Niger resisted setting an election date for 18 months post-coup. It wasn’t until a “national dialogue” in February 2025 that a renewable five-year transition was proposed. General Tchiani, already promoted to army general, followed suit by taking a five-year presidential oath in March 2025, echoing the power grabs of his AES counterparts.
These prolonged transitions are not accidental. They provide the space for the AES to formalize its confederation project, forge new regional and international alliances—such as Russia’s pledge of military support for the AES’s joint force—and sidestep ECOWAS sanctions. For the EU, this new reality demands a recalibration of its engagement strategy with the Sahel.
controlling the narrative: censorship and repression
Unable to assert control over their territories, AES regimes have turned to controlling information. Independent and foreign media outlets have been banned, journalists expelled or intimidated, and civil society organizations dismantled. Political parties face suspension and surveillance.
In Mali, authorities have systematically restricted free expression since 2020. In 2022, RFI and France 24 were banned, followed by the suspension of Joliba TV News in late 2024. The withdrawal of Joliba TV’s broadcast license after a program on a staged coup highlighted the AES’s coordinated media crackdown. Between 2022 and 2024, critics faced arbitrary arrests and harassment, including the expulsion of the UN Human Rights Chief in February 2023. By late 2023, NGOs were shuttered, and political parties suspended for three months, with media muzzled on the issue.
Burkina Faso mirrored this trajectory. Foreign journalists were expelled, RFI and France 24 banned, and Jeune Afrique suspended for criticizing the military. In 2024, TV5 Monde was suspended for airing an interview with a former electoral commission president critical of the junta. Since early 2025, a new wave of repression has targeted exiled opposition figures, placed on “terrorist” lists to intimidate them. In March, three journalists were abducted, reappearing days later in military uniforms—forced to “cover the ground reality”—a stark example of coerced conscription.
Niger swiftly followed suit. Within a week of the 2023 coup, RFI and France 24 were suspended. Since then, media outlets have been shut down, and journalists covering security issues face intimidation and imprisonment. Human rights organizations have documented arbitrary detentions—including former President Mohamed Bazoum and seven cabinet members—forced disappearances, and violations of fair trial rights. Political activities have been suspended since July 2023, silencing formal opposition. Since October 2024, foreign passport holders arriving in Niamey have had their documents retained until departure, severely restricting movement and exerting control over external actors.
The regimes’ claims of territorial control are increasingly detached from reality. In October 2024, Burkina Faso asserted it controlled 70% of its territory—the same percentage attributed to jihadist groups by external research. For civilians, discerning truth from propaganda is becoming an impossible task.
why the Sahel cannot be ignored
The Sahel’s absence from global headlines is not a sign of stability. It reflects media fatigue, the repression of independent journalism in AES states, and waning Western interest following forced withdrawals. Yet the crises driving European and international engagement in the region persist—and are worsening.
Jihadist expansion continues unabated, food insecurity is spiraling, and displacement is at record levels. Between June and August 2025, 52.7 million people in West Africa are expected to face acute hunger. By March 2025, 3.1 million internally displaced persons were recorded across Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad alone.
The European Union may no longer prioritize the Sahel amid other global urgencies, but disengagement carries risks. Instability in the Sahel does not stay within its borders. The humanitarian, security, and migration crises it fuels will inevitably reverberate across Europe in the medium to long term.
While the EU reassesses its approach—marked by a more subdued French presence—cautious steps toward re-engagement are emerging, including through the new EU Special Representative. Before deepening ties, the EU must clarify its priorities: What does it seek to achieve? What can it deliver? And with whom?
One certainty remains: in an era of global polarization, strengthening continental and intercontinental solidarity is essential to confront shared challenges. The Sahel’s silence is not peace—it is a warning of deeper, more dangerous storms ahead.