The synchronized assaults by the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) on April 25, 2026, marked a pivotal strategic shift in Mali, unprecedented since 2012. By striking simultaneously across key locations including Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré, these groups exposed the critical vulnerabilities of a security framework heavily reliant on external partners. The subsequent recapture of Kidal significantly undermines the Malian junta’s narrative of legitimacy and reveals the inherent limitations of its Russian partnership in confronting jihadist threats. While a direct military takeover of Bamako appears unlikely in the immediate future, JNIM continues to wage a protracted war of attrition. This escalating instability poses a growing risk of regional contagion, exerting immense pressure across the entire Sahel and the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea.
Bamako under increasing pressure
The coordinated offensive by JNIM and FLA on April 25, 2026, represents a significant escalation in Mali’s ongoing security crisis. The simultaneous attacks on Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré were both meticulously coordinated and unexpected. This surge in violence is part of a continuous deterioration observed since 2020, a trend further exacerbated by the junta’s ascent to power in August of that year.
Initially operating primarily in Mali’s northern rural areas, JNIM has steadily enhanced its capability to strike further afield with increased intensity and coordination. In recent years, its operations have expanded westward and southward into regions previously less affected. Its influence now extends beyond Malian borders, reaching coastal nations such as Togo, Bénin, and Nigeria. Concurrently, the number of attacks attributed to the group has sharply risen, particularly those targeting the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). In July 2024, FAMA, supported by the Russian Africa Corps group, suffered a major defeat against a coalition comprising JNIM and the CSD-DPA. Since then, JNIM has launched a series of assaults on military bases in Tombouctou in the north, Bamako in the south, and Kayes in the west. Meanwhile, FAMA has also bolstered its capabilities, notably with Bayraktar drones supplied by Turkey, although these are far from providing comprehensive territorial surveillance.
Since September 2025, JNIM has implemented a strategy to economically strangle Bamako, a capital city of approximately 3.2 million inhabitants. This involves disrupting logistical routes and targeting fuel convoys, aiming to progressively erode the government’s legitimacy. By directly impacting the population’s living conditions, particularly through rising fuel prices and associated economic disruptions, JNIM seeks to weaken the junta’s credibility while positioning itself as a viable alternative. The more the junta is weakened in rural areas and Bamako, the more JNIM appears as a credible alternative and a potential governance option in the eyes of the populace. The blockade of the capital effectively stages the state’s impotence. JNIM thus aims to improve its image not by forcibly seizing the capital, but by demonstrating that an alternative form of authority can exist. In areas under its control, the group has established a parallel administrative structure based on Islamic justice, taxation, and trade regulation, enabling it to present itself as a concrete alternative to an absent state.
A military takeover of the capital remains improbable for now, given the group’s estimated strength of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters, facing a city that concentrates the majority of Mali’s security forces and infrastructure. JNIM also lacks sufficient popular support, especially in urban centers. However, sporadic attacks against Modibo Keita International Airport, which hosts the Africa Corps base, could increase. Conversely, rural areas, characterized by weak state presence, offer a fertile environment for the group’s entrenchment. Furthermore, the Bamako blockade suggests that a military capture of the capital is not a short-term objective, with the strategy focusing on psychological warfare and attrition. The increasing pressure on Bamako, however, allows for the concentration of FAMA responses there, thereby easing their grip on other parts of the territory.
Kidal’s recapture and the narrative’s erosion
The April 25 attacks vividly illustrate this surge in power. In Kati, the heart of Mali’s military command, Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed. In Bamako, Modibo Keita Airport was struck. In Kidal, JNIM and FLA regained control of the city, which FAMA and Wagner had recaptured in 2023 in what was then hailed as a historic victory. This strategic reversal is unprecedented since 2013, forcing Africa Corps elements to withdraw from both Kidal and Gao. The pressing question now is whether FAMA will be able to retake the city in the coming weeks.
This recapture of Kidal by JNIM echoes the dynamics of 2012 when Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups initially cooperated before ideological differences led to their division. JNIM advocates for the establishment of Sharia law, while Tuareg rebels champion an autonomist agenda centered on Azawad. Kidal then became a symbol of this fracture, contested by both sides. These divergences persist today, but the identification of common adversaries—the junta and its Russian partner—has fostered an opportunistic tactical convergence. Signs of rapprochement had already circulated as early as March 2025. According to experts on jihadist movements, negotiations may have occurred in December 2024 with the aim of combining efforts. The durability of this opportunistic coalition and its ability to maintain control of Kidal remain to be seen.
These attacks occurred despite an alleged truce that was supposed to be signed in late March 2026 between JNIM and the Malian government. This agreement reportedly involved the release of a number of jihadists in exchange for lifting the fuel blockade on Bamako. Mali subsequently denied releasing 200 jihadists. The veracity of this agreement therefore remains questionable. Whether it existed or not, it clearly failed to halt JNIM’s offensive momentum.
On April 28, JNIM announced the commencement of a