Mali Voice

Your English-language guide to Mali's news landscape — clear, credible and up to date.

Mali Voice

Your English-language guide to Mali's news landscape — clear, credible and up to date.

Mali’s challenging reality five years after the Goïta coup

Politics

Mali’s challenging reality five years after the Goïta coup

Five years ago, Assimi Goïta seized power in Mali through a military coup. Since then, his leadership has faced considerable criticism, yet paradoxically, he maintains significant popular support. An in-depth analysis of the current situation in Mali provides insight into these complex dynamics.

Portrait d'Assimi Goïta

Exactly five years have passed since General Assimi Goïta’s military coup brought him to power in Mali. During this period, the nation has seen a significant decline in the living conditions for many Malian citizens. Concerns have mounted regarding diminished security, restricted freedom of expression, and a shrinking space for press freedom. This critical look at Mali’s current affairs explores these issues.

To better understand the intricate situation, I spoke with Ulf Laessing, the Sahel Program Director for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali. His insights shed light on the challenges facing West Africa’s Mali politics.

An interview with Ulf Laessing on Mali’s current state

Ulf Laessing highlighted the escalating repression. “Freedom of speech is no longer easily exercised,” he explained. “While candid discussions are still possible among trusted individuals in Mali, people have become considerably more cautious. This is a clear indictment of the government’s approach. Furthermore, critical voices have been imprisoned, and others compelled into exile.”

Portait d'Ulf Laessing, directeur du programme Sahel de la fondation Konrad Adenauer au Mali

Question: What improvements, if any, have Malian citizens experienced since the military assumed control?

Ulf Laessing: “Initially, some regions witnessed minor security enhancements. The road to Ségou, for instance, remained open for an extended period, allowing some farmers to return to their fields. However, this is no longer the case. The crisis has deepened. With explosive population growth, climate change impacts, and pervasive insecurity, I am highly pessimistic that any government, regardless of who is in power, can significantly alter the trajectory.”

Qui finance le JNIM et le FLA qui ont attaqué le Mali ?

Question: In 2020, the military pledged to eradicate jihadist threats. This objective seems far from being achieved.

Ulf Laessing: “The JNIM and Islamic State effectively control significant portions of the country. I believe it’s unlikely any government, whether through another coup or a future elected administration, will manage to reclaim these territories. My outlook for pacifying the nation remains rather bleak.”

Question: Late April saw a series of coordinated attacks by jihadists and Tuareg rebels. What does this signify?

Ulf Laessing: “Indeed, it was a profound shock. This constituted the largest assault since 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadists briefly dominated the north before French intervention a year later. It was a direct challenge to the state’s authority. While the government in Bamako has maintained its position, and the rebels don’t appear to be advancing further, they have lost control over certain northern areas. This incident represents a significant blow to their prestige, a dramatic attack that caught everyone off guard, especially the Russians, who were ostensibly present to bolster security.”

Question: These Russian mercenaries reportedly withdrew without significant engagement. Mali’s allies, Niger and Burkina Faso, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), offered verbal support but no military assistance. Mali found itself relatively isolated. How do you interpret this?

Ulf Laessing: “The Russian presence has always been more about optics than substance. They have approximately 1,500 to 2,000 mercenaries on the ground, which is only a third of the French forces who previously struggled to pacify the entire country. The Russians’ brutal tactics have arguably exacerbated the conflict. Ultimately, their withdrawal from Kidal and two other northern locations without a fight was a humiliation. Similarly, we saw little concrete action from Niger and Burkina Faso. They claimed to have provided air support, but in reality, Mali was largely on its own that day. This isn’t surprising, as Niger and Burkina Faso are themselves grappling with severe jihadist insurgencies. I doubt they possess the capacity to assist Mali, even if they had the strong desire to do so.”

Des soldats du FLA dans une voiture, traversant une caserne antérieurement utilisée par l'Africa-Corps à Kidal

Question: Does the solidarity often proclaimed by the three AES states prove weaker in practice than it appears?

Ulf Laessing: “Politically, they are very aligned and share many aspirations. However, they lack both the political will and, critically, the capacity to implement these plans. While the three military leaders are united by a common ideology, these are also three of the world’s poorest nations. We must be realistic about what this cooperation can achieve. This isn’t a European Union building infrastructure together or a NATO alliance providing mutual defense. These are three extremely impoverished countries fighting for their very survival.”

Assimi Goïta, Abdourahamane Tiani et Ibrahim Traore côte à côte

Question: What potential solutions exist for Mali?

Ulf Laessing: “A positive aspect is that the Malian populace does not desire Sharia law or Islamist rule. This sentiment could have fueled protests against the government, despite the inherent dangers and repression. Yet, it hasn’t materialized because the people fundamentally reject these alternatives. I hope this provides a foundation for future action, leading to genuine negotiations with the more moderate elements among the jihadist groups, ultimately fostering a path towards dialogue.”

Question: But what could be the basis for negotiations? Jihadists seek control and the imposition of Sharia law. How can one negotiate with such entities?

Ulf Laessing: “I don’t believe the JNIM is capable of controlling a major city like Bamako or the entire country. Their primary goal is to be left undisturbed. They aim to control specific regions and establish arrangements with other factions. In Bamako, they desire a government that might implement more aspects of Sharia law and engage in negotiations with them. Unlike some Middle Eastern counterparts, these jihadists are not foreign invaders intent on violence for its own sake. They are local individuals, often exploiting issues like access to water and land. At some point, I believe discussions must commence. Military action is necessary, but so is dialogue with moderate figures. There are already subtle pressures for such engagement within Mali.”

Des personnes avec des bidons d'eau dans lac asséché de Faguibine dans la région du Tombouctou.

“Mauritania faced a similar dilemma. Their response combined military force with compromises, such as the prohibition of alcohol and the designation of the country as an Islamic Republic. It’s not about implementing a full Taliban-style agenda, but perhaps finding common ground to satisfy certain demands. Once instability is reduced, the state will naturally have greater capacity to act.”

Question: What do the people of Mali truly want?

Ulf Laessing: “The people in Bamako do not want to live under Sharia law. We observed this during the late April attacks: there were no widespread protests or strong demands for the government’s resignation because people understand that if this government falls, the next one is likely to be even more Islamist. This is precisely what they wish to avoid. Despite all the criticisms leveled against the military government, it must be acknowledged that many still support it. They reject the alternatives: they don’t want jihadists, nor do they want a return to the old, corrupt elites who were perceived as tied to France and Europe. Therefore, I believe that if no further major attacks occur, the current government will likely remain in power, given the support it commands.”

Question: So, you don’t feel that social media portrays a false impression, and that in reality, a significant portion of the population, especially the youth, supports Assimi Goïta’s government?

Ulf Laessing: “The average age in Mali is 15. Many young people are out of school and have no connection to Europe or France. They primarily get their information from social media, which is rife with propaganda, including Russian-backed misinformation designed to bolster the government. I still believe there is genuine support for the current administration. After the late April attacks, it would have been an opportune moment for protests, as the regime was weakened. The same was true last autumn when fuel deliveries were disrupted. Yet, no significant protests occurred, clearly indicating that people do not want to be governed by the JNIM.”

De la fumée sur les routes de Bamako

Question: Perhaps they are too preoccupied with basic survival, a situation now exacerbated by the blockade imposed on Bamako?

Ulf Laessing: “Life has undeniably become much harder, even before these recent attacks. People have grown resigned; they’ve lost all faith in politicians. It’s also important to acknowledge that political parties and established politicians have lost considerable credibility. Many of them have held power before, and nothing improved. Consequently, a significant portion of the population feels, ‘Let’s give those currently in power another chance.’ This sentiment is crucial for understanding Mali’s current affairs and the dynamics of Bamako news.”

Mali’s challenging reality five years after the Goïta coup
Scroll to top