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Mali rebel offensive: crisis deepens amid political uncertainty
The Malian junta led by Assimi Goïta, backed by Russian forces, faces unprecedented pressure following a massive April 25 offensive by jihadist factions of the JNIM (affiliated with Al-Qaïda) and separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Northern cities stand at risk of falling, echoing the 2012 crisis—but with critical differences. Western intervention appears unlikely, raising urgent questions: What are the rebels’ objectives? How will Russia respond? How should European nations prepare for a potential jihadist proto-state in Mali? Jonathan Guiffard examines the unfolding risks for civilians and the accelerating fragmentation of the Sahel.
On April 25, 2026, a coordinated military campaign was launched across Mali by the JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, Al-Qaïda’s Sahelian affiliate) and the FLA against Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Russian Wagner Group operatives. The offensive has intensified pressure on Bamako’s government and revived fears of northern Mali’s collapse—a scenario last seen in March 2012, though under vastly different political conditions. What distinguishes today’s crisis from 2012? And what short-term outcomes can be anticipated?
Key questions arise: What objectives do the rebels seek? How will Russia react? And what role should Europe play as the Sahel’s stability hangs in the balance?
Current context: the most ambitious offensive in years
The April 25 offensive targeted five strategic cities—Bamako, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti—marking the first large-scale joint operation by jihadist and separatist forces since 2012. Unlike sporadic coordination since 2024, this offensive reflects a deeper tactical alignment. Combat operations focused on positions held by FAMa and Russian mercenaries, with Bamako’s Kati military district and airport among the symbolic targets.
A preliminary assessment reveals the following developments:
- Northern towns now under rebel and jihadist control. Kidal has fallen, along with neighboring towns like Tessalit and Anéfis. Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit have also been seized, gradually encircling Tombouctou and Gao. However, key military bases in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok remain contested.
- Junta leaders struck directly. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was killed, and other officials, including General Modibo Koné (head of Mali’s National Security Agency), were injured. President Assimi Goïta, the junta’s leader, was reportedly evacuated to Turkey’s embassy before reappearing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials.
- Rumors of an attempted junta takeover by General Malick Diaw circulated but remain unverified. One certainty remains: military leaders at the helm of power were severely shaken by the assault.
While this offensive mirrors the 2012 crisis, critical differences emerge:
- JNIM and FLA have coordinated closely, with JNIM allowing FLA leaders to take public roles. Unlike previous years, Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun Kouffa (JNIM leaders) have avoided public appearances, with only high-ranking JNIM figure Sidan Ag Hitta spotted in Tessalit.
- Negotiation and disarmament now take precedence over violence. Rather than executing captured soldiers, as in 2012, the groups seek to negotiate the surrender of FAMa troops, positioning themselves as protectors of both civilians and military personnel against Bamako’s junta.
- Negotiations with Russian mercenaries enabled their orderly withdrawal from key northern bases like Kidal, mirroring tactics seen in Syria. Algeria may have facilitated these talks, likely in coordination with the FLA.
- The northern campaign relied on simultaneous attacks in central Mali and Bamako, with the capital enduring its longest assault to date.
Negotiations with Russian mercenaries allowed them to withdraw from key northern bases without resistance, mirroring tactics observed in Syria.
This offensive underscores a strategic evolution by both armed groups. Rather than seeking territorial control, they appear to be implementing a strategy of strangulation, gradually tightening their grip on cities and the junta since 2020. By April 28, the JNIM had announced a total blockade of Bamako, burning transport trucks to signal resolve while the junta organizes limited supply convoys.
Unlike 2012–2013, Bamako has not collapsed. The regime, FAMa, and their Russian allies have attempted to regain momentum through military operations. However, civil society voices—including political figures like Oumar Mariko and former minister Mamadou Ismaïla Konaté, along with Imam Mahmoud Dicko—have renewed calls for negotiations, criticizing the junta’s purely military approach. The Brussels-based Alliance of Sahel Democrats (ADS) echoes these concerns. Meanwhile, the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (EIWS) launched an attack on Ménaka but was repelled by Russian-Malian forces. Though not part of the JNIM/FLA offensive, EIWS remains a persistent threat in northeastern Mali.
An anticipated crisis
The April offensive did not come as a surprise. In a September 2022 analysis, we warned that Russia’s military support was illusory, failing to address Mali’s security challenges due to its counterproductive tactics. Far from bolstering stability, Russia’s presence has alienated civilians and failed to curb JNIM’s expansion.
- In January 2023, a forward-looking exercise predicted this scenario, including:
- Rising tensions between the CMA and FAMa/Wagner forces would reignite armed clashes in northern Mali, with the CMA aligning with JNIM to regain control over the Niger River loop and potentially half the country;
- The central region’s fragmentation would fuel regular clashes between Macina Katibat and community militias, eventually ceding control to JNIM;
- Bamako would face encirclement, though full occupation remained unlikely unless the army collapsed entirely;
- A loss of control over Mali would trigger political tensions, culminating in negotiations with JNIM to establish a lasting truce, potentially altering the constitution or ceding territory.
By November 2023, we noted that Kidal’s recapture by FAMa and Russian forces was unsustainable. The CMA had strategically retreated, preparing for a future counteroffensive—a prediction confirmed by the July 2024 clashes and the recent conquests.
These insights confirm the crisis was foreseeable. What remains is to explore likely short-term developments.
Short-term outlook
Militarily, the JNIM/FLA coalition is poised to negotiate the withdrawal of Russian forces from northern Mali before seizing Gao and Tombouctou, effectively partitioning the country as occurred in March 2012. That year, Kidal fell first, followed by parallel advances on Gao and Tombouctou, with mass desertions among Malian troops accelerating the collapse. Today, FAMa’s continued desertions risk repeating this dynamic, especially amid the junta’s fractured command structure and political turmoil in Bamako. If Russian forces withdraw from Gao and Tombouctou, the jihadist-separatist coalition’s control over the Niger River loop becomes inevitable.
The only factor capable of slowing this advance is the threat posed by Malian and Burkinabe TB2 drones. While JNIM/FLA may target Malian drones, striking Burkinabe or Nigerien drones presents greater challenges.
Northern Mali is likely to fall under FLA and JNIM control, though their objectives differ. The FLA seeks de facto autonomy without pursuing outright political independence, while JNIM appears content with a less rigid application of Islamic law. This nuanced approach reduces the likelihood of a 2012-style scenario, where jihadists imposed violent governance. Recall that AQMI’s defeat in 2013 led its leaders to advocate for a softer expansion strategy, prioritizing proselytization over strict rule.
The capture of northern cities will position the armed groups advantageously but create two additional fronts: combating the Islamic State in Ménaka and resisting aerial incursions by Malian and Burkinabe forces. Unlike 2012, JNIM fighters are active in central Mali, and new attacks on FAMa garrisons in Gossi, Boni, Hombori, Niafunké, and Konna are likely. However, these operations may focus on disrupting military deployments rather than seizing towns. Recent reprisals against civilians in Kori-Kori and Gomossogou highlight a tension between JNIM’s political messaging and its violent tactics—a fragility its leadership acknowledges.
The fate of central and southern Mali remains uncertain for two reasons: JNIM already controls rural areas in the center, where it frequently besieges cities and negotiates local agreements (a strategy akin to the Vietminh in Vietnam or the Taliban in Afghanistan). However, unlike the Taliban, JNIM lacks the troop numbers to sustain large-scale territorial control. The 2012–2013 capture of northern cities enabled jihadist recruitment in central communities—a strategy that, if repeated, could significantly strengthen JNIM.
The siege of Bamako represents a deliberate strategy to asphyxiate the junta, either forcing regime change or pushing it toward negotiations.
The siege of Bamako is a calculated strategy to strangle the junta, either forcing its collapse or compelling negotiations. Despite propaganda to the contrary, the junta’s inability to respond effectively is evident. Assimi Goïta, like Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, is trapped in Bamako. Growing mistrust between junta leaders, particularly Goïta’s skepticism toward Russia, threatens to destabilize the regime. The temporary or permanent sidelining of pro-Russian figures like Sadio Camara and Modibo Koné could weaken the Russia-Mali partnership, accelerating northern and central Mali’s fall. Ongoing negotiations and months of tensions between FAMa and Russian mercenaries—who have criticized the Malian army since the Tinzawaten defeat—further underscore this fragility.
Unless negotiations are imposed, the junta has little choice but to maintain its Russian partnership to survive, though regaining territory appears improbable. If Russia disengages, Mali’s options narrow. Burkina Faso and Niger, themselves embroiled in jihadist conflicts, may offer limited support. Senegal could mobilize at its border but is unlikely to deploy troops amid JNIM’s growing presence. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire are likely to observe from the sidelines, privately welcoming the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.
Prospectively:
- The fall of northern Mali is inevitable, followed by the loss of central regions. While timing is uncertain, the balance of power is clear.
- The Russia-Mali partnership is unsustainable, as is Bamako’s military strategy—a reality the latest offensive has laid bare.
- Two potential catalysts could emerge:
- Negotiations, triggered by the junta’s collapse or external diplomatic pressure;
- External military intervention, reversing the balance of power as Barkhane once did.
Mali and the international community: navigating an uncertain path
Multiple scenarios are likely to unfold, none mutually exclusive.
Scenario 1: The prospect of external military intervention
What happens when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Before 2022, such an act would have triggered Western military intervention.
What course of action remains when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Before 2022, such a move would have prompted Western military intervention (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali) to dismantle jihadist networks. However, the withdrawals from Afghanistan and the Sahel necessitate rethinking this approach, given their proven inefficacy. Is regional or international military intervention desirable, feasible, or realistic?
Regionally, only Algeria’s army could reverse the tide, though it is unlikely to intervene outside its borders under its non-interventionist doctrine. Mauritania has maintained a non-aggression pact with AQMI and JNIM since 2010. Other regional armies, having already clashed with jihadists, lack the capacity to mount effective counteroffensives and will likely maintain defensive postures. Only international intervention could temporarily shift the balance, as Barkhane once did. France, the UN, and the EU are unlikely to commit forces unilaterally, while the U.S. prioritizes other theaters. Negotiations thus remain the most plausible path forward.