President Emmanuel Macron has adopted a confrontational stance to describe the current state of affairs between France and the military governments in the Sahel region. Asserting that Paris was met with “ingratitude” in return for its efforts, the French head of state unequivocally marked the conclusion of a diplomatic era that spanned over a decade. This remarkably direct statement is clearly aimed at the ruling juntas in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey – three capitals that have successively informed France of the termination of their bilateral military cooperation.
Presidential remarks solidify Sahelian estrangement
The forceful tone from the Élysée Palace stands in stark contrast to the usual diplomatic reserve when addressing African partners. By highlighting France’s substantial human and financial sacrifices, Emmanuel Macron seeks to place the onus of this diplomatic breakdown squarely on the transitional authorities that emerged from the coups of 2020, 2022, and 2023. His comments also resonate with a domestic audience, as the Sahel situation continues to be perceived in France as a significant strategic setback following the compelled withdrawal of Operation Barkhane in 2022.
Nevertheless, the presidential declaration risks further complicating an already precarious situation. In both Bamako and Niamey, the official narrative has been built upon condemning a French presence deemed intrusive, if not neocolonial. Each grievance-laden statement from the Élysée inadvertently fuels the sovereignist rhetoric championed by Colonel Assimi Goïta, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, and General Abdourahamane Tiani. European diplomatic missions, closely observing these developments, fear that such direct language could also strain their remaining channels of communication with these Sahelian capitals.
The Alliance of Sahel States and France’s receding influence
Since the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023, which evolved into a confederation by July 2024, the three military regimes have rapidly accelerated their diplomatic reorientation. This includes their departure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a deepening alliance with Moscow through Africa Corps (succeeding Wagner), and burgeoning ties with Ankara and Tehran. The geopolitical repositioning of Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey is proceeding at an accelerated pace. France, which once maintained considerable economic leverage through entities like the CFA franc, Orange, TotalEnergies, and Eramet, now observes its influence diminishing.
Concretely, the announced departure of the last French troops from Chad and Senegal by the end of 2024 completes Paris’s military disengagement from the Sahelo-Saharan front. The French military footprint in West Africa, which numbered over 5,000 personnel in 2020, has now shrunk to a residual presence, primarily focused on training and intelligence. This significant contraction fundamentally transforms France’s long-standing influence model, which historically relied heavily on force projection.
A double-edged rhetorical strategy for Paris
By publicly invoking the ingratitude of its African partners, Emmanuel Macron risks reinforcing a postcolonial interpretation that has already gained significant traction among Sahelian public opinion, particularly within urban and youth demographics. The term, whether intended or not, harks back to a paternalistic discourse that the French executive had actively sought to dismantle since the Ouagadougou speech in November 2017. The stark contrast between initial promises of a renewed Franco-African relationship and the current reality of a rupture is now undeniable.
Furthermore, the presidential declaration comes at a time when Paris is actively working to rebuild its African partnerships around states considered more stable, from Morocco to Côte d’Ivoire, including Bénin and Mauritania. This strategy of bypassing the Sahel necessitates carefully measured public statements, lest it contaminate the entire spectrum of diplomatic relations. Several African diplomats, even from allied nations, privately express discomfort with what they perceive as an overly personal register.
In Dakar, Abidjan, and Nouakchott, these developments are being closely watched, as they underscore France’s struggle to cleanly close a chapter without reopening old wounds. The critical question remains: how can Paris restore its credibility as an attentive partner on the continent while grappling with a Sahelian legacy it feels has been unjustly received?