The interpretation of what constitutes a coup d’état often varies, shaped by the self-interests and political will of the international community and its neighboring states. In Burkina Faso, the appointment of Transitional President Michel Kafando was notably deemed unconstitutional. For at least twelve months, the nation was set to operate under provisional institutions, meticulously assembled to guide the country forward.
Much like a complex construction, the transitional institutions gradually took shape. Following the dramatic emergence of military figures onto the public stage, in the wake of Blaise Compaoré’s swift departure from Kosyam, Ouagadougou appeared to regain a measure of calm.
Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, seemingly from obscurity, quickly asserted control, assuming the full mantle of a Head of State. His true intentions remained a subject of intense speculation. How did he manage to integrate himself among the protesters and political party leaders so effectively? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, perhaps, a pre-arranged strategy between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré, designed to maintain some influence over the reins of power? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the populace naturally raised significant suspicion and mistrust. The early actions and decrees by the military, including the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly, fueled concerns about the establishment of a military junta. This threatened to strip the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, of their hard-won victory.
True to form, the African Union promptly threatened sanctions against Burkina Faso. Concurrently, a high-level delegation of ECOWAS Heads of State – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – arrived to assess the situation and urgently press the military to soften its stance. The precedents set by captains like Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali likely prompted Burkinabé officers to reconsider their approach: firstly, seizing power by force rarely goes unpunished; and secondly, a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the nation and leading to widespread unpopularity.
Consequently, the military eventually negotiated a hybrid solution, formalized in the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that a civilian would lead the executive as Transitional President, while the military would retain significant influence over the government. A 90-member legislative body, the National Transition Council (CNT), was established to accommodate key figures who had spearheaded the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising about twenty members, was tasked with the weighty responsibility of naming the Transitional President. This temporary arrangement was set to conclude in November 2015, coinciding with the end of Blaise Compaoré’s original mandate.
For the selection of the Head of State, each vital national component – the military, civil society, opposition parties, religious, and traditional authorities – submitted a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five personalities were selected:
The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, editor of the weekly l’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publication director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ critical stance against the former regime. The military adopted a broader approach, diversifying candidate profiles to include an ecclesiastic figure, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, the Archbishop, initially a strong contender, declared his disinterest in the role, preferring to focus on his current ministry.
The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage: their extensive experience in prominent international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented Burkina Faso at the UN headquarters in New York, from 1981 to 1982 and again from 1998 to 2011. In the ‘Land of the Upright Man,’ an unspoken divide often separates individuals into supporters or opponents of Thomas Sankara. This implicit cleavage has historically influenced the trajectory of political figures. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity between 1984 and 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Thomas Sankara’s government, during Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo’s presidency in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements regarding the diplomatic conduct of Upper Volta and held diametrically opposed ideological views.
A career within an international institution offers dual benefits: a significant boost to one’s curriculum vitae and an invaluable network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.
For a limited period, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, was compelled to set aside his cattle and poultry farming in Saponé for a noble cause: safeguarding the nation in crisis! He assumed both the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic channels, providing a single point of contact for international partners and circumventing interaction with the Head of Government, Isaac Zida.
The evolving situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored by several capitals: Accra, which chaired ECOWAS at the time; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for their geopolitical interests. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (African Union), Ghana (ECOWAS), Togo, Benin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a move to reintegrate Burkina Faso. Did this strong representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States typically adheres to the principle of not cooperating with heads of state who have not received popular electoral mandate, a situation that applied to Burkina Faso. The international community, therefore, found a way to legitimize the coup and restore a semblance of constitutional order. This ensured that American reconnaissance aircraft could remain stationed in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as strategic footholds for surveillance in the Sahel region.
Out of 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four crucial portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Defense Ministry; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Security Minister in 2011, took charge of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, was appointed to Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was given the position of Keeper of the Seals, perhaps as a consolation, while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned merely days after his appointment due to public pressure from civil society, which criticized the former prosecutor for having ‘shelved’ the Norbert Zongo case.
The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 votes out of 90. The next crucial steps involve completing the institutions and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including establishing the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), drafting a new electoral code, and enacting organic laws.
What are the key objectives for this brief transitional period?
Since early December, Michel Kafando signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate are critical. Over 27 years after the assassination of Thomas Sankara, the ‘Land of the Upright Man’ is finally poised to begin a process of catharsis. One of President Michel Kafando’s first decisions after his appointment was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also announced that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would seek the “extradition” of former President Blaise Compaoré from Morocco.
Through a series of public declarations, the current leaders effectively opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases demand a considerable amount of time, likely extending beyond the transitional period. Were these statements made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s primary focus. In this context, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s chief of staff and Isaac Zida’s direct superior – was dismissed from his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.
The question remains whether Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma will maintain loyalty to General Gilbert Diendéré. Burkina Faso managed to defuse the political crisis of October 30th, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with relatively few major incidents. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial clashes could have easily triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to prioritize the holding of elections rather than embroiling General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by exhuming the Sankara case?
How can a cycle of retribution be avoided? Already, two general managers of major national companies, considered close to the ousted president’s family, have been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou of the Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo of the Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition does not fully absolve past transgressions, it contributes to reconciliation; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid tribute to the seven individuals who fell victim to bullets during the events of October 30th and 31st, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery.
Will the CRNR endure beyond the conclusion of the transitional period? With all institutions now in place, political figures and parties are set to take center stage. No major political heavyweight opted to occupy a seat in either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively disqualifies them from running in future universal suffrage elections. Presidential election candidates are already poised at the starting blocks. The creation of the CNT provided an opportunity for the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to dissolve itself. The electoral battle is certainly expected to commence early in 2015.