A year after its charter was formalized and its confederation established, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, frequently faces scrutiny regarding its ability to fulfill its central pledge: mutual defense. Amid recent escalations in security threats and significant jihadist attacks impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a joint armed intervention has prompted questions among local populations and regional observers alike.
Several structural and strategic factors contribute to this operational inertia on the ground in Niger.
Saturated national armed forces
The primary constraint remains the overwhelming demands placed on the national armed forces of each member state. Every nation within the alliance contends with intense security threats within its own borders:
- In Mali: The army and its allies are primarily focused on maintaining control over the northern and central regions, battling the Permanent Strategic Framework (JIM) and groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda.
- In Burkina Faso: More than half of the country’s territory endures constant pressure from persistent terrorist assaults.
- In Niger: Military forces must concurrently secure the Liptako-Gourma region, often referred to as the ‘three borders’ area, against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the Lake Chad basin.
Given these demanding circumstances, none of the three states possess sufficient strategic reserves to deploy a substantial contingent to a neighboring country without compromising their own national security apparatus. This situation is a key challenge for West Africa Mali news and broader Sahel security efforts.
Logistical hurdles for a joint force
While the political decision to unify forces was agreed upon during AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of this joint force encounters significant material realities:
- Interoperability and command: Harmonizing diverse military doctrines and establishing an integrated chain of command requires considerable time and the development of secure transmission networks.
- Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops over vast distances in the Sahel necessitates extensive armored transport, resupply capabilities, and aerial intelligence assets (such as drones and combat aircraft). These crucial capacities are currently limited and heavily utilized locally.
The role of external partners
The withdrawal of traditional military forces, notably France and the UN mission MINUSMA, has led the three military regimes to reorient their partnerships, particularly towards Russia, often involving the deployment of paramilitary groups like Africa Corps. However, these supporting forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally intended to conduct cross-border operations under the AES banner.
A strategic choice prioritizing intelligence
Beyond the large-scale projection of troops, AES authorities emphasize an alternative form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted, punctual operations along shared borders. For the Sahel’s military command, intervention does not necessarily manifest as a large, visible deployment but rather as coordinated actions within the three-border zone, where each army primarily operates from its own territory. This strategic approach aims to enhance Mali current affairs and regional security through more agile, intelligence-driven efforts.