In just over two months, the president of the Republic will wield a constitutional tool that was previously off-limits: the dissolution of the National Assembly. With a Parliament controlled by Pastef and an executive now backed by its own party, Senegal is approaching a pivotal date. We break down the timeline, the options on the table, their costs, and what each side stands to gain or lose.

The date is no accident. Article 87 of the Constitution allows the head of state to dissolve the National Assembly once the first two years of the legislature have elapsed. The current Assembly, dominated by Ousmane Sonko’s Pastef, was elected in November 2024 and installed its bureau on December 2, 2024. Therefore, December 2, 2026, marks the first day dissolution becomes legally possible.

The context, however, has radically changed since the installation of this fifteenth legislature. Since his break with Ousmane Sonko’s Pastef on May 22, 2026, the president no longer holds a parliamentary majority. The former prime minister has taken the helm of the Assembly, while the president has formed a new government and launched his own party, Kiiraay. Senegal is thus experiencing an unprecedented form of cohabitation, in which the head of state and the parliamentary majority come from the same movement but no longer share the same line.

What the president says, and what his allies say

Officially, nothing is decided. Speaking in New York, Bassirou Diomaye Faye downplayed speculation, recalling that ‘we are not yet at December 2’ and that no date had been set for a dissolution or elections. However, he has never closed the door.

Within his entourage, the tone is far less cautious. In mid-August, Trade Minister Serigne Guèye Diop announced that Senegal is heading toward new legislative elections, accusing the parliamentary majority’s deputies of ‘sabotaging’ the president’s actions. He specifically criticized Pastef lawmakers for systematically rejecting initiatives from the Palace. Between the president’s caution and the eagerness of some of his ministers, suspense is maintained, and it likely serves the presidential strategy: the threat of dissolution weighs on parliamentary debates well before becoming reality.

If the president signs the decree in the first days of December, the country would embark on an express legislative campaign. The Constitution frames this delay, with a vote to be organized between sixty and ninety days after dissolution, placing new legislative elections between late January and early March 2027. The 2024 precedent gives an idea of the pace: dissolved on September 12, the Assembly was renewed by November 17.

This timeline, however, collides with another deadline. Prime Minister Ahmadou Al Aminou Lo has announced that territorial elections will be held on January 17, 2027. Two national ballots just weeks apart would pose serious logistical and political problems. A possible ‘coupling’ of the two votes, mentioned by some officials, runs up against legal deadlines. Dissolution could therefore lead to a reshuffling of the local election calendar, a prospect civil society is already monitoring closely.

The status quo scenario: cohabitation under tension

The other option is to do nothing, at least immediately. Dissolution is a right, not an obligation, and the president can choose to let the legislature run its course. But this status quo would come at a price: governing with an Assembly that is no longer aligned. The first test is already here. The revised finance law, tied to the IMF agreement, was received by the National Assembly on September 18, and Ousmane Sonko has publicly demanded clarifications on the content of the IMF agreement and on debt treatment. The 2027 budget will follow.

In this scenario, every important text would become a tug-of-war. The president has already set the terms of the debate by reminding everyone of their responsibilities and asserting that the people are the ultimate arbiter. The status quo would not be peace, but a war of position, with the January territorial elections becoming the first judge.

The financial question is not a detail in a country negotiating with its lenders and trying to contain its debt. The 2024 precedent offers a reliable basis for calculation. During the vote on that year’s revised finance law, the finance minister estimated the cost of organizing the early legislative elections of November 17, 2024, at 20 billion CFA francs. Electoral materials alone weigh heavily: with 41 competing lists, the Interior Ministry spent over 11 billion CFA francs on printing ballots and campaign documents. For comparison, the total cost of the March 2024 presidential election was around 14 billion CFA francs.

A new dissolution would therefore require at least 20 billion CFA francs, to be added to the cost of the territorial elections. The debate has already begun within the presidential camp itself, where a Kiiraay departmental official in Kaolack has taken a stand against holding the local vote immediately, calling public spending irresponsible given social emergencies.

What Diomaye Faye and Kiiraay have to gain or lose

For the head of state, a successful dissolution would be the only way to regain a majority and govern without hindrance until the end of his term. That is the whole point of Kiiraay, launched in July to durably structure his majority and prepare for upcoming electoral deadlines, particularly the local elections scheduled for 2027.

The risk, however, is considerable. The party is barely two months old and has never faced the polls. A defeat in the legislative elections would leave the president facing an Assembly re-legitimized by the vote, and thus even more hostile, for the rest of his term. This is what makes the January territorial elections so strategic: they can serve as a barometer before playing the dissolution card, or conversely reveal a weakness that would make it suicidal.

Pastef starts from a dominant position, with 130 of the 165 seats won in 2024. In an early election, the party has mathematically almost nothing to gain in seats and much to lose. But the stakes lie elsewhere. A clear victory after the split would validate the thesis of its militants, who accuse the president of betraying the project, and would make Ousmane Sonko the true political center of gravity in the country.

Sonko’s party is not mistaken. At the very moment the president launched Kiiraay, the president of the National Assembly was leading a national tour dedicated to the campaign to sell PASTEF membership cards. Each camp is preparing for an electoral battle, whether the date is set in January or later.

For the formations crushed in 2024, a recomposition would be a windfall. The division of the former majority opens an unprecedented space, and an early election would offer the opposition a chance to regain parliamentary representation worthy of the name. It will nevertheless have to choose its positioning vis-à-vis two blocs that both claim the legacy of the 2024 rupture. A tactical alliance with one camp or the other could become the key to the next election.

Ultimately, December 2 does not mark the day of a decision, but the moment when all options become possible. The president can dissolve from that day, wait for the verdict of the territorial elections, or keep the threat in reserve as a means of pressure on the deputies. Until then, the examination of the revised finance law and the 2027 budget will say much about the climate between the two heads of the former tandem. One thing seems certain: 2027 will open under the sign of the ballot box, and that may be where the real arbitration between Diomaye Faye and Ousmane Sonko will play out.