Armed groups still contesting territory across the Sahel

On the morning of October 9, 2026, heavy fighting broke out between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) in the Tessit area, along the border with Burkina Faso. Each side claims a decisive victory: JNIM-linked sources say the rival organisation suffered major losses on several fronts, while IS-S sources insist they defeated JNIM and seized new ground.

Those competing accounts cannot by themselves establish who actually won. What they do confirm is a troubling reality: armed groups continue to battle for territory in the Sahel, and civilians remain exposed to insecurity, forced displacement and the wider consequences of that war.

A security contradiction the juntas can no longer avoid

The clashes highlight a central contradiction in the security narrative of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which together form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since taking power, those authorities have made the recovery of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism core arguments for their legitimacy. Yet the persistence of armed groups their ability to move, organise and fight raises hard questions about the effectiveness of the strategies being pursued.

The core problem is not only the existence of terrorist groups but the persistent difficulty states face in preventing them from establishing a lasting presence on their own soil. Tessit illustrates this: while the two organisations jostle for position, local populations continue to bear the costs of an insecurity that has not disappeared despite repeated promises to restore order.

External interference claims and the burden of proof

AES authorities regularly denounce foreign interference and, depending on the circumstances, accuse certain neighbouring countries of facilitating armed group activity or serving as rear bases for fighters. Such accusations must be weighed against verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not, on its own, prove that its leaders support or knowingly host them.

One question remains unavoidable: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups continue to operate in areas where the state struggles to reassert lasting authority?

Sovereignty rhetoric versus conditions on the ground

A key challenge for the Sahel’s military regimes is now to show that their strategic choices yield concrete results. Switching military partners, expelling Western forces and moving closer to Russia were presented as ways to regain control of the security situation.

But those changes alone are not enough to eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and violence across different Sahel regions are a reminder that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, the protection of civilians and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.

A United Nations report released in 2026 described sustained activity by JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also noted clashes between the two organisations over territorial control.

That reality undermines narratives that present security difficulties as solely the result of outside manoeuvres. Regional and cross-border factors are real, but they do not absolve any government of accountability for its own results.

The political stakes of staying in power

Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how to prevent persistent insecurity from becoming a permanent argument for concentrating power and delaying a return to normal constitutional order?

It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders willingly host or nurture terrorist groups in order to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent and verifiable elements.

It is legitimate, however, to examine the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their governance.

The distinction matters: denouncing the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming that leaders themselves organise that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second demands proof.

Populations want results, not just explanations

In Tessit, the opposing claims by JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet allow a definitive conclusion on who won the October 9 clashes. But that uncertainty does not change the main issue: these organisations remain capable of mounting operations and contesting control of certain areas.

For residents, the consequences are tangible. Insecurity hampers movement, disrupts economic activity and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot indefinitely substitute for measurable results on the ground.

The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger thus face a simple demand: demonstrate their ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from entrenching themselves and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.

Sovereignty is not measured only by the partners a state chooses or the foreign forces it expels. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.

As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer one question: beyond rhetoric and accusations aimed abroad, what lasting results can they show to guarantee the security of their people?

By Maimouna Kaboré — Journalist

By Maimouna Kaboré — Journalist