Why Niamey’s uranium strategy after Orano is a high-stakes balancing act

The coup of July 2023 didn’t just shift Niger’s political compass—it redrew the entire map of its uranium sector. By breaking ties with France’s Orano, Niamey sought to reclaim control over a resource that has long defined its economic identity. Nationalising the state-owned Somaïr, revoking Orano’s Imouraren licence, and courting new partners like Russia, China, and Western investors sent a clear message: Niger was no longer willing to let foreign firms call the shots. Yet behind the bold headlines lies a more complex question—are these new alliances truly unlocking better deals for Niamey, or is the country trading one set of constraints for another?

The Orano rupture: a bold move, but one that leaves critical gaps

Orano’s exit wasn’t just symbolic. It was industrial, legal, and financial. The French giant lost operational control of its Niger operations in December 2024, and by June 19, 2025, the Somaïr mine—long the backbone of Niger’s uranium output—was officially nationalised. Orano, which had held a 63.4% stake in Somaïr compared to the state’s 36.6%, immediately contested the move, launching international arbitration proceedings. For Niamey, the victory of sovereignty came with a steep price: regaining control of the mine didn’t equate to regaining a stable market.

Uranium production in Niger has plummeted over the past decade. From 4,116 tonnes in 2015, output shrank to just 962 tonnes in 2024. With only one active mine remaining and multiple stalled projects, the country’s industrial and logistical capacity is struggling to keep pace with its newfound ambitions. The result? A sovereignty paradox: Niamey now owns its uranium, but it lacks the infrastructure, buyers, and pricing power to maximise its value.

Uranium pricing: separating myth from market reality

One of the most persistent narratives links Niger’s post-Orano fortunes to a supposed jump in uranium prices. Yet the comparison is deceptive. Unlike oil, uranium doesn’t trade on a single global exchange with a daily benchmark price. Instead, contracts are negotiated privately between producers, intermediaries, and nuclear utilities, often blending spot prices with long-term formulas. The historical data, however fragmented, offers some clues.

In 2020, Niger received an estimated 48.1 billion West African CFA francs for 1,113 tonnes from the Cominak mine and 103.3 billion CFA francs for 1,879 tonnes from Somaïr. Breaking this down reveals a price of roughly 83.75 euros per kilogram for Somaïr’s uranium—a figure based on publicly available data at the time. Other analyses, drawing from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (ITIE), suggest that Orano’s purchases in recent years hovered around 45,000 CFA francs per kilogram (about 33 USD per pound), while some European or Japanese buyers reportedly paid closer to 60,000 CFA francs per kilogram.

Fast-forward to 2025-2026, and the market has shifted dramatically. By 2025, the average spot price paid by European utilities reached $70.33 per pound (up from $53.59 in 2024), while long-term contract prices averaged $54.70 per pound. By late September 2026, the spot price had surged to $89.63 per pound, with long-term contracts hitting approximately $96.50 per pound. The conclusion is clear: Niger is operating in an environment where prices are significantly higher than in the early 2020s. But does this mean Niamey is now selling its uranium at these elevated rates? The evidence remains murky.

Unverified claims and opaque deals

The most explosive allegation involves a purported agreement between Niger and Russia. In 2025, reports surfaced that Niamey had allegedly sold 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake to Russia for $170 million—a price tag that would equate to roughly $170 per kilogram or $77 per pound. This figure falls below late-2026 spot prices but aligns with some long-term contract levels. The catch? Neither Niger nor Rosatom has ever officially confirmed the deal. Niamey’s government denies any sale, while Rosatom stated it was not party to the alleged agreement.

Yet the narrative isn’t mere speculation. In November 2025, approximately 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake were loaded onto trucks in Arlit. Around 30 vehicles, accompanied by military escorts, made their way toward Niamey before grinding to a halt at the capital’s airport. The physical transfer alone doesn’t constitute proof of a sale—but it does underscore Niamey’s active efforts to commercialise its stockpiles. The $170 million figure, therefore, remains an allegation, not a verified contract.

The Iran dossier adds another layer of opacity. In 2024, reports emerged of confidential negotiations between Niger and Tehran over the sale of 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at around $56 million. While Western and Nigerien sources confirmed the talks, the government denied any finalised sale, with a senior advisor claiming Tehran’s interest was rebuffed due to insufficient stock. Again, the distinction between negotiations and executed contracts is crucial: the discussions were real, but the deliveries remain unverified.

Russia, China, and beyond: diversifying partners, but at what cost?

For Niamey, Russia has emerged as the most visible nuclear ally. In December 2025, Niger’s Timersoi National Uranium Company inked a cooperation agreement with Rosatom’s Uranium One Group to explore new deposits and develop future mines. China, too, has shown interest in Arlit’s stockpiles, with discussions reportedly underway over another 1,000 tonnes in 2025. Yet these new partnerships don’t guarantee premium prices. What they *do* offer is leverage—more buyers mean more competition, which could, in theory, drive up bids.

But theory doesn’t always translate to reality. The Nigerien government’s control over its uranium chain is a step forward, yet production shortfalls, logistical bottlenecks, and legal uncertainties—including a September 2025 ruling by a CIRDI arbitral tribunal that barred Niger from selling or transferring uranium tied to the Somaïr dispute—threaten to undermine its strategy. Sovereignty alone doesn’t create a solvent market.

The paradox of Niger’s uranium gamble

Niger’s endgame is clear: sell uranium at the best possible price. But to achieve this, it must meet four critical conditions: consistent production, secure transport, foreign investment, and legally binding contracts. In 2026, Niamey took a step toward the latter by creating Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company to replace the nationalised Somaïr. Meanwhile, Western investors are trickling back—most notably in September 2026, when the U.S. approved up to $414 million in financing for Canada’s Global Atomic and its Dasa project.

The shift isn’t merely about swapping France for Russia or China. It’s about transforming Niger’s uranium into a geopolitical chess piece—a lever to extract concessions from multiple powers. Yet, for all the talk of diversification, no public evidence yet confirms that Niamey’s new contracts are yielding higher returns than those struck with Orano. Prices are up, negotiation options are expanding, but the actual terms—including pricing formulas, premiums, logistics costs, and the share retained by the state—remain shrouded in opacity.

Whispers of ‘shadow deals’ persist, particularly around Iran and Russia, warranting deeper scrutiny. But to label them as confirmed contracts would be premature. The real test for Niger isn’t just whether it can find new buyers—it’s whether it can structure deals that ensure its citizens see tangible benefits. Until those deals see the light of day, Niamey’s uranium gamble remains an unfinished story.

What comes next for Niger’s uranium sector?

The next 12-18 months will be decisive. Niger’s ability to:

• Ramp up production: Restarting stalled projects like Imouraren or reviving the Cominak mine could restore volumes lost over the past decade.
• Secure transparent contracts: Open bidding processes and public disclosures could dispel doubts about opaque deals.
• Navigate legal hurdles: Resolving the arbitration dispute with Orano may unlock critical revenue streams tied to disputed uranium.
• Balance geopolitics: Leveraging interest from Western, Russian, and Chinese firms without ceding too much control or accepting unfavourable terms.

Until then, Niger’s uranium story is one of potential rather than proof—a narrative still being written, line by line, in the shadows of its mines and the corridors of its capital.

By Maimouna Kaboré — Journalist