The creation of Niger’s Command of Protection and Development Forces (CFPD) in May 2024 was meant to secure critical infrastructure—from oil pipelines to mining sites. But behind its stated mission lies a deeper power struggle over control of troops, funds, and ultimately, the future of the country’s defense apparatus.

From decree to dilemma: how a new defense structure became a battleground

The CFPD was established by decree (n°2024-309/P/CNSP/MDN) with a clear mandate: safeguard national resources and strategic corridors. Supported by state-backed contracts with extractive industries, the framework promised to channel millions of FCFA monthly into a dedicated operational budget. Yet, what began as an administrative move quickly evolved into a contest over who truly holds the reins of military power.

Where the numbers meet the narrative

Article 28 of the decree outlines a payment mechanism calculated at 12,000 FCFA per soldier per day. At an estimated force of 5,000 personnel, this translates to nearly 1.8 billion FCFA monthly or 21.9 billion annually. These figures, though theoretical, are not trivial. They represent a claim on national resources that sits at the heart of ongoing institutional conflict. But theory and reality often diverge. The pressing question is not about potential earnings, but actual spending: who authorized payments? For how many soldiers? And for which operations?

The invisible battle: finance, politics, and operational control

If the CFPD was designed as a military tool, it quickly became a financial and political flashpoint. Reports suggest that key figures within the transitional government clashed over its implementation. One particular allegation attributed to President Abdourahamane Tiani claims he intervened to block financial provisions of the decree. While no public document confirms this, the implication is profound: could a president’s refusal to release funds undermine a legally decreed military structure?

This tension reveals a deeper structural conflict. The Ministry of Defense seeks operational funds. The Ministry of Finance oversees public spending. And at the apex, the presidency holds ultimate authority. Each step in the chain carries consequences: delayed payments weaken defense capabilities; unchecked spending raises corruption risks; and opaque contracting fuels distrust. In a system where financial control equals operational control, the stakes are existential.

The Zeine-Mody shift: what the January 2026 reshuffle really signaled

When Lamine Zeine was removed from the Finance portfolio in early 2026 while retaining the Prime Minister’s office the move was widely seen as a political signal. Some analysts interpreted it as a signal that Defense Minister Salifou Mody was positioning himself to consolidate both defense and prime ministerial powers. Such an outcome, if realized, would merge two of the most influential levers in state power: oversight of security and control over national finances. Whether intentional or not, the reshuffle underscored a growing centralization of authority and raised concerns about checks and balances.

Domol Leydi enters the fray: overlapping security structures, overlapping risks

By late 2025, Niger introduced another layer to its security framework: Domol Leydi, or village-level self-defense groups. Officially sanctioned as part of a national mobilization effort, these groups operate under the supervision of the defense and security forces. Their emergence raises a critical strategic question: why create a parallel structure when a specialized command like the CFPD already exists?

The answer may lie less in security logic and more in power dynamics. While Domol Leydi focuses on territorial defense, the CFPD targets industrial and logistical security. Yet both depend on the same scarce resources: manpower, funds, equipment, and legitimacy. When multiple structures compete for the same inputs, clarity in command and accountability becomes fragile. Who recruits? Who pays? Who gives orders? And who is accountable when things go wrong?

The blurred line between defense and development

The CFPD’s dual mandate to protect both people and economic assets touches a sensitive nerve. Oil pipelines, mining sites, and development corridors are not just infrastructure; they are pillars of national economy. When a military command is tasked with securing these assets, it blurs the line between sovereign defense and corporate security. This dual role increases the risk of privatization of public interests. Who benefits when contracts are awarded? Are payments tied to real services, or to political favors? Tracking this requires auditing contracts, payment orders, and mission logs none of which have been fully disclosed.

The documentation gap: why paperwork matters more than promises

Allegations of mismanagement or intentional sabotage cannot be substantiated without concrete evidence. To reveal the truth, the following records must be examined:

• Official strength reports (actual vs. projected personnel)

• Mission orders and deployment logs

• Contract terms with extractive companies

• Payment vouchers and financial statements

• Supervisory and audit reports

At present, only fragments of this data are available. Without full transparency, the 1.8 billion FCFA per month remains a theoretical figure one that could mask either robust defense funding or systematic diversion. The absence of verifiable documentation is not incidental; it is the heart of the crisis.

High treason vs. administrative failure

Rumors of “high treason” have circulated in political circles, invoking Niger’s legal framework that defines treason as acts endangering national sovereignty such as fraudulent resource management or ceding territory. While no charges have been filed, the allegation itself reflects the gravity of the accusations being whispered. The real issue is not semantics, but consequences: if defense funds were misallocated, delayed, or weaponized for political ends, the damage would extend beyond budgets. It would erode public trust in institutions and weaken the nation’s defense posture at a time of regional instability.

The ultimate accountability test

The CFPD-Domol Leydi dossier is more than a bureaucratic dispute. It is a stress test of Niger’s governance infrastructure. When a state creates a security apparatus funded by public-private contracts, the public has a right to know: Is the money being used as intended? Are soldiers being paid? Are contracts fulfilled? Who signs off on expenditures?

These are not technical questions. They are existential ones. In a region facing jihadist threats and economic pressures, the misuse of defense funds isn’t just corruption it’s a national security risk. Whether the issue is delayed payments, inflated contracts, or diverted resources, the result is the same: weaker defenses, stronger suspicions, and a crisis of legitimacy.

Until financial records are audited and command chains mapped, the 1.8 billion FCFA monthly remains a specter a shadow budget fueling both hope for security and fear of abuse. The only way to dispel the doubt is through full disclosure. Until then, the real battle isn’t over who controls the troops it’s over who controls the truth.

What comes next?

Independent audits. Legislative oversight. Public accounting. These are not optional steps; they are constitutional duties in a functioning democracy. Niger’s transition government has repeatedly pledged transparency. If the CFPD and Domol Leydi are to serve the nation rather than specific factions, that transparency must begin with the flow of money. Without it, the “protection” promised by these structures will remain an illusion and the real protectors will be not the soldiers, but the spreadsheets.

By Maimouna Kaboré — Rédacteur en chef

By Yacouba Ouédraogo — Journalist d’investigation