While Niamey continues to keep its border with Bénin sealed, citing demands for robust security assurances, a complex question now confronts Niger following the re-establishment of ties between Chad and France. If a French military presence in a neighboring state is deemed a sufficient threat to justify closing a border, should this same principle logically extend to Chad?
The shared border between Niger and Bénin remains shut. Nearly three years have passed since the July 2023 coup, and despite announcements of normalization between Niamey and Cotonou, this crucial communication route has yet to be effectively reopened.
Nevertheless, signs of easing tensions have emerged in recent months. Both nations have re-engaged in dialogue and established a technical framework tasked with assessing the conditions for a reopening. Discussions have also advanced on security, economic, and legal aspects.
However, Niamey persists with its demands.
In a recent public address, General Abdourahamane Tiani articulated that reopening the border must be contingent upon guarantees, specifically concerning security and the absence of forces perceived as hostile operating near the frontier. This position aligns with the long-standing stance of Nigerien authorities: Niamey insists that Bénin’s territory must not serve as a staging ground for operations that could endanger Niger.
The core issue is that Cotonou vehemently disputes this accusation.
Cotonou denies, Paris also
Since the onset of the crisis, Béninese authorities have refuted allegations that France maintains military bases within Bénin, particularly in the northern regions.
The Béninese government consistently asserts that it has never hosted a foreign military base on its soil. Olushegun Adjadi Bakari, Bénin’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, reiterated this point as recently as January 2025.
Paris, too, has denied the existence of any French military base in northern Bénin. In March 2026, General Fabien Mandon, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces, dismissed these accusations, affirming that no French base exists in that part of the country.
Yet, a crucial distinction must be made.
France does provide a form of security support to Bénin. French military personnel have participated in training programs and offered assistance to Béninese forces confronting armed groups in the country’s north. For instance, reports in April 2026 detailed the discreet presence of French special forces operating alongside Béninese troops. Officially, French authorities refer to these personnel as trainers.
Therefore, it is essential to differentiate between two aspects: the acknowledged Franco-Béninese military cooperation, which is not denied, and the existence of a permanent French military base or deployment near the Nigerien border, which both Cotonou and Paris deny.
It is precisely upon this distinction that a significant part of the current debate hinges.
An exigency that places Niamey before a new equation
Indeed, while Niger imposes conditions on Bénin, another of Niger’s neighbors is re-establishing its relationship with Paris.
In November 2024, Chad had notably ended its military cooperation with France, declaring its intent to fully exercise its sovereignty and diversify its security partnerships.
The French withdrawal was then presented as a major turning point in relations between N’Djamena and Paris.
However, over the past several months, the two capitals have been drawing closer once more. French military personnel are gradually returning to Chad, operating under a much more discreet and reduced arrangement than previously existed.
This development addresses a pressing security reality: Chad faces the ramifications of the war in Sudan, the persistent threat of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin, and significant requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and logistical capabilities.
N’Djamena can thus interpret France’s return as a sovereign and pragmatic decision.
But for Niamey, this choice presents a pertinent question.
Chad, too, is a direct neighbor of Niger.
Consequently, if Niamey deems a French military presence near its territory a sufficiently grave threat to prevent the reopening of its border with Bénin, how does Niger intend to respond to the renewed Franco-Chadian rapprochement?
Why would Chad be different from Bénin?
Herein lies the true paradox.
Niamey could certainly argue that every state is free to choose its military partners. Under this logic, Bénin would be entitled to cooperate with France, and Chad would likewise be entitled to renew ties with Paris.
However, in that scenario, this very same logic should lead Niger not to make Franco-Béninese cooperation a decisive condition for reopening its border.
Conversely, if Niamey genuinely believes that French military cooperation with a neighbor constitutes an actual threat to its national security, then the same reasoning should, logically, apply to Chad.
The question, therefore, is not whether Niger should close its border with Chad.
Rather, it is about testing the consistency of its own arguments.
Why would military cooperation with France be unacceptable for Niger’s western neighbor, but acceptable for its eastern neighbor?
Geography renders this question particularly sensitive. Niger shares an extensive border with Bénin, but also with Chad. A foreign military presence in Chad can, theoretically, be considered part of Niamey’s immediate strategic environment.
The return of France to Chad, a test for the sovereignist doctrine
The Chadian situation unfolds within a profoundly transformed regional context.
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have elevated sovereignty and a break from former partner powers as central tenets of their new foreign policy. These three nations have withdrawn from ECOWAS and intensified their cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States.
Chad, however, has opted for a different trajectory.
After ending its partnership with Paris in 2024, N’Djamena now appears keen to resume military cooperation with France, while simultaneously maintaining its other partnerships.
This choice is sovereign.
Yet, it could prove difficult to reconcile with a conception of sovereignty that would deny neighbors the right to choose their own partners.
Thus, it is less the French presence in Chad itself, and more the principle of consistency, that now sits at the heart of this debate.
Towards a resolution between Niamey and Cotonou?
The situation, however, could still evolve.
Ongoing discussions between Niger and Bénin indicate that both countries recognize the economic and security costs of their border closure. For nearly three years, populations, traders, and transporters in the border region have borne the brunt of a political crisis that far transcends their local interests.
Furthermore, violence in the border area shared by Bénin, Niger, and Nigeria has significantly escalated, underscoring the imperative for enhanced security cooperation between the two nations.
A border reopening could, therefore, become a shared objective.
To achieve this, however, Niamey and Cotonou will likely need to move beyond the issue of France.
The debate cannot indefinitely remain confined to an opposition between « French presence » and « African sovereignty ».
If Niger genuinely seeks security guarantees from Bénin, it is legitimate to request them. But these guarantees must be founded on verifiable facts, mechanisms for transparency, and reciprocal commitments.
Crucially, they must be applied according to the same principles to all neighbors.
The gradual resumption of French military cooperation with Chad thus introduces a new dimension to this crisis.
Niamey now faces a choice: either acknowledge that every sovereign state is free to choose its partners, or uphold a doctrine that deems French military cooperation with a neighbor a threat justifying retaliatory measures.
In the former case, reopening the border with Bénin could be facilitated.
In the latter, the rapprochement between N’Djamena and Paris risks presenting Niger with a question that will be difficult to evade: if France is a threat in Bénin, why would it not be in Chad?
It is perhaps within this apparent contradiction that one of the primary challenges of Sahelian diplomacy lies today: to make sovereignty a principle applicable to all, and not merely an instrument wielded according to the power dynamics between neighboring states.