Thousands of Moroccan nationals arrived in Ceuta by swimming just one week after Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s visit to Algeria. In 2021, nearly 9,000 people entered the country after Spain hosted the leader of the Polisario Front [a political and armed independence movement opposing Morocco] in a Spanish hospital.

The chaos at the border between Ceuta and Castilejos [Moroccan city known as Fnideq] has escalated into one of the most significant migration crises in five years. Despite Moroccan police blocking road access, a relentless flow of young people, families, and even individuals with reduced mobility dispersed through the hills or swam across the sea to reach Spanish soil.

Spanish government denies strained bilateral relations

Spanish authorities insist bilateral relations remain strong. Foreign Ministry sources described the current agreement with Morocco as “excellent,” emphasizing the “intense” migration coordination between the two nations. After hours of institutional silence, the Moroccan government confirmed Spain’s claims, stating both countries had agreed on the repatriation of those who entered Ceuta illegally.

Legal decision “misinterpreted” by experts

Significant uncertainty surrounds the events. Spain’s Interior Ministry, led by Fernando Grande-Marlaska, attributes the episode to human trafficking networks that allegedly “exploit a court decision” to facilitate irregular migration flows.

This recent Supreme Court ruling establishes that all individuals entering Spanish territory are entitled to legal assistance and an “individual assessment” of their status. Ruth Ferrero, a political science professor and researcher at the Complutense Institute of International Studies (ICEI), argues the interpretation is flawed: “It simply applies international asylum law, but that doesn’t mean there’s an ‘open door’ policy or that repatriations cannot occur. This isn’t an obstacle to traffickers exploiting the situation, as the Interior Ministry suggests.”

A repeat of 2021’s crisis

In May 2021, a similar situation unfolded when nearly 9,000 people entered Ceuta in apparent retaliation against Morocco for hosting the Polisario Front leader, Brahim Ghali, in a Spanish hospital—a move Morocco called “deplorable.” Later reports from Spain’s National Intelligence Center (CNI) revealed rumors circulating among sub-Saharan migrants that Moroccan security forces would lift coastal controls that day.

This isn’t the first time Rabat has used mass migration as a diplomatic tool with Madrid. Haizam Amirah Fernández, Executive Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CEARC), notes a “pattern” in these influxes: “Moroccan authorities use human movement to send messages, often tied to unmet expectations from its leadership.”

Ferrero urges caution, warning against interpreting all migration pressure from Morocco as a political strategy: “Concretely, what we’re seeing now doesn’t appear to respond to a Moroccan political objective, at least based on available information and Interior Ministry statements.” For her, the real issue lies in how disinformation networks and criminal gangs have fueled the crisis.

According to police sources from the Spanish news agency EFE, Moroccan authorities attempted to curb the influx by conducting checks on public transport and roads, but the ripple effect overwhelmed their security forces.

Ceuta surge follows Sanchez’s Algeria visit

The mass entry into Ceuta occurred a week after Pedro Sanchez’s visit to Algeria, signaling “a new phase” in Spain’s relations with the Maghreb nation. During meetings with President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Prime Minister Sifi Ghrieb, discussions focused on gas supply—a critical issue amid the Middle East conflict and the Strait of Hormuz blockade.

“I can’t say this is a determining factor, but the timing is striking,” Amirah Fernández remarks regarding a possible link between the Ceuta events and Spain’s recent proximity to Algeria. “Rivalry between the two countries has persisted since independence. While there have been phases of cooperation and regional integration attempts, the current period ranks among the worst in decades. It’s reasonable to assume Sanchez’s visit wasn’t well received in Rabat.”

For Morocco, according to the expert, Spain’s relations with Maghreb countries are often seen as a “zero-sum game”: “If Spain improves ties with Algeria, it’s perceived as harming Morocco—and vice versa.”

Ferrero adds that Morocco holds a position of power over Madrid, but this is “a consequence of a security-focused policy and outsourcing migration management” to third countries. “It’s not that Morocco deliberately sought this role, but it has skillfully leveraged a context where European governments, including Spain’s, have delegated migration control to external actors.”

The Western Sahara conflict fuels tensions

The migration crisis five years ago followed a series of bilateral tensions between Spain and Morocco. In December 2020, Rabat suspended the High-Level Meeting (RAN) with Madrid days after Donald Trump, in his first term, recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel. Months later, Spain hosted Brahim Ghali, who arrived from Algeria for COVID-19 treatment in Logroño.

Morocco “took note” of this hospitality toward the Polisario leader, which sparked a border incident resulting in two deaths.

“The Spanish-Moroccan relationship is complex,” Amirah Fernández states. “Morocco operates with an assertive style—decisions are concentrated in a small circle, and force is often employed.”

Since its independence in 1956, post-French and Spanish protectorates, conflicts over Western Sahara—the former Spanish Sahara, invaded by Morocco in 1975—have marked relations. Madrid relinquished control of the territory in 1976, and today, 80% is occupied by Morocco, with the remaining area held by the Polisario Front, founded in 1973 as a Sahrawi liberation movement.

Since Trump’s presidency, Washington’s pro-Morocco stance appears to have pushed the Western Sahara conflict to a point of no return. The former U.S. president’s 2020 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the region triggered a diplomatic crisis, catalyzing the 2021 Ceuta crisis.

A turning point occurred in 2022 when Pedro Sanchez wrote to Mohamed VI, seemingly endorsing Morocco’s autonomy proposal for Western Sahara—a departure from Spain’s historic neutrality. “What truly happened with this letter is that the Spanish government abandoned its neutral stance,” Amirah Fernández explains. “Previously, Spain supported any solution agreed upon by the parties. However, in this letter, it explicitly favored the autonomy proposal for Western Sahara within the Moroccan Kingdom—the very option advocated by Rabat. This doesn’t equate to a legal recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory.”

The role of social media in the crisis

Beyond any potential political motives from King Mohammed VI’s regime, social media undoubtedly played a key role in this migration crisis. A study by the North African Human Rights Observatory found that 81% of young people surveyed in the Tanger, Tétouan, and Al Hoceima regions believe social media content portrays irregular migration as “a solution to improve living conditions.”

The study, based on a survey of 500 young people, also revealed that 78.4% said they easily find posts promoting irregular migration, while 74.2% follow pages providing information or assistance in planning such journeys.