The silence that has returned to Niamey’s streets should not deceive anyone. The battle is over, but the political war is only just beginning.
During the night of 28 to 29 August, Nigerien soldiers attempted to overthrow the regime of General Abdourahamane Tiani. The attack, launched notably by troops from units engaged on various fronts across the country, targeted strategic installations in the capital, including Air Base 101 and areas near the presidential palace. For several hours, the government hung in the balance.
To save it, Tiani had to call on his Russian allies. The men of Africa Corps, successors to the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa, intervened alongside loyalist Nigerien forces. They participated in retaking the air base and neutralising the mutinous soldiers. The Nigerien army regained control of the base with the support of Russian paramilitary forces.
Here lies the major political fact of this crisis: Nigerien soldiers were fought on Nigerien soil with the direct backing of Russian forces who came to protect the regime that emerged from the 2023 coup. Yet the junta had made national sovereignty its primary argument for expelling French and American forces.
Sovereignty with a double standard
For years, Tiani and his supporters told Nigeriens that the French military presence was a humiliation and an assault on national sovereignty. The French soldiers left. The Americans were asked to leave. Western military agreements were denounced. The regime’s propaganda could then proclaim that Niger had finally regained its full independence.
But an embarrassing question now arises: what is the point of chasing out French soldiers if, a few years later, the government must call on Russian soldiers to save its presidential seat? This question is all the more explosive because the Russians did not intervene to defend Nigerien territory against jihadist groups. They intervened to help the government repel Nigerien soldiers threatening the regime.
The symbolism is devastating. Nigerien soldiers have been dying for years in the Sahel’s war zones. They fight the Islamic State and JNIM, suffer heavy losses, and regularly denounce their combat conditions. The Niamey mutiny seems precisely to have been fuelled by this accumulated frustration among units facing daily jihadist violence. And when those same soldiers turn against the government, it is the Russians who come to fight them.
What sovereignty remains when the national government can no longer ensure its own survival without foreign protection?
The fracture between Tiani and his army
The 29 August mutiny is likely the most serious warning signal Tiani has received since coming to power. The problem is not only that soldiers tried to overthrow him. The problem is that they could do so while Niger officially has a considerable security apparatus. Above all, the dissent seems to have found fertile ground within the ranks of the regular army.
Soldiers deployed on the fronts are the ones paying the highest price of the war. They see their comrades fall, face material hardships, and witness jihadist attacks continuing despite the junta’s promises. Since 2023, Tiani promised to restore security and give Niger back its dignity. Three years later, jihadist violence remains a major threat, and Nigerien forces continue to suffer significant losses.
In this context, part of the army seems to be wondering whether the regime has drifted away from those who actually fight on the ground. And the Russian intervention could have turned that frustration into hatred. A Nigerien soldier can accept dying to defend his country, can accept hardships and sacrifices in the name of the nation. But it will be much harder to accept that foreigners come to shoot at him to protect a political regime.
Tiani, from Bazoum’s toppler to Moscow’s protégé
The historical paradox is dizzying. In July 2023, Tiani seized power, claiming he wanted to save Niger from a political system incapable of guaranteeing citizens’ security. He overthrew democratically elected president Mohamed Bazoum, alleging he was ending the failures of civilian rule. Today, three years later, it is his own government that needs foreign fighters to resist a military revolt. The trajectory is hard to ignore.
Tiani came to power through a coup. He now maintains power thanks to a security apparatus with a crucial Russian component. In other words, the man who claimed to free Niger from foreign tutelage seems to have replaced Western dependence with Russian dependence. This contradiction could become the regime’s Achilles’ heel.
What if Bazoum had accepted French help?
We must also look back to July 2023. When Tiani overthrew Mohamed Bazoum, France still had over a thousand soldiers in Niger. Paris supported the elected president and, under certain circumstances, contemplated an operation to contribute to his release. Some close to Bazoum had requested French intervention. At the time, an operation was considered, but Bazoum allegedly preferred dialogue and refused direct French military intervention.
That decision now belongs to history. But a question persists: if Bazoum had accepted the French intervention, would Tiani have succeeded in his coup? No one can rewrite history with certainty. But it is perfectly legitimate to note that Tiani benefited from that hesitation. The elected president remained a prisoner in the presidential palace while the junta gradually consolidated its control over the state apparatus. The most ironic part is that today, the man who denounced the French presence in Niger calls on a foreign power to save his own rule.
Algeria steps into the game
As if the Russian presence were not enough, Algeria has just taken a significant step. Following the attempt to overthrow Tiani, Algiers deployed military assets to Niamey, including combat and transport aircraft. This decision marks an important shift in Algeria’s doctrine, which had long been marked by reluctance to commit forces beyond its borders.
Algeria ultimately did not have to fight the mutineers; they had already been repelled with Russian help. But the message was clear: Tiani would no longer be alone. Moscow militarily protects the regime. Algiers now provides strategic support. And the junta can present this encirclement as proof that Niger has new allies.
Yet behind this show of force lies a troubling question: how many foreign powers will it take to protect a government that seems to be gradually losing the support of part of its own army?
The volcano beneath the barracks
The 29 August mutiny may not be an isolated incident. It could be the first symptom of a much deeper rupture. Russian weapons allowed Tiani to win a battle. They did not resolve the frustrations of Nigerien soldiers. They did not destroy jihadist groups. They did not bring back the soldiers killed at the front. They did not reconcile the troops with the government. They simply allowed the regime to survive a first overthrow attempt.
And that is precisely where the danger lies for Tiani. A regime can control a palace with foreign help. It can retake a military base. It can arrest mutineers. But it cannot indefinitely govern against an army that is beginning to see its own government as dependent on a foreign power.
General Tiani should therefore look beyond the walls of his palace. The real threat to his regime may not be in Paris, Washington, or even the Western capitals he routinely accuses of plotting against him. It may be in the Nigerien barracks. And if the soldiers who watched their comrades fall to foreign bullets one day decide to settle scores with those they accuse of having sold their country to Moscow, the next mutiny could be far harder to contain.
The Russians can protect Tiani. Algeria can support him. But no foreign power can forever replace the loyalty of a national army. Tiani’s regime may have won the battle of 29 August, but it may have lost something far more precious: the trust of those who wear the Nigerien uniform.