With the 2027 dual elections approaching, economist Serge Alain Godong delivers a blunt assessment of Cameroon’s political landscape.
Using the theory of games and the prisoner’s dilemma as analytical frameworks, he argues that Maurice Kamto’s 2018 defeat was inevitable—and that another victory remains highly unlikely. In a detailed examination, Godong paints a picture of a regime in its twilight years, where voters prioritize the certainty of the familiar over the uncertainty of change.
«The openly twilight nature of the four-decade-old regime now shapes the dynamics of stability and transformation in Cameroon’s public sphere,» writes Godong, an economist with degrees from Sciences-Po Paris, EHESS, and Paris X. His analysis hinges on 2018, when the initial shock over what he terms the «penalty goal»—Kamto’s claim to have «scored» the disputed election—faded. Since then, Paul Biya has been sworn in for another term, the Movement for the Rebirth of Cameroon (MRC) has been effectively sidelined, and most Cameroonians have «accepted the quiet continuation of power at Etoudi.»
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Godong’s argument rests on two core assumptions: «humans are fundamentally calculating,» and «they require information to secure their gains.» An election, in this view, is a moment when a leader proposes a kind of social contract to the nation. Yet Kamto, he contends, cannot offer a more compelling contract than the one currently in place. «The nearly 8.5 million Cameroonian voters heading to the polls next year would only consider supporting Maurice Kamto if they could be certain he would better safeguard their interests than Paul Biya.»
The economist estimates that roughly 16 million Cameroonians—civil servants, formal private-sector employees, professionals, and their families—currently benefit from the system. «We can estimate that about 1.5 trillion Central African CFA francs are distributed annually to the 16 million Cameroonians who fall into this category,» he notes. These individuals rely on public salaries, government contracts, and major infrastructure projects. «These Cameroonians—and their networks—will almost certainly cast their votes for the RDPC and its candidate, fully aware of what they are choosing.»
This leads to what Godong describes as the «prisoner’s dilemma»: without coordinated information or proof of a superior alternative, voters default to the status quo. «Cameroonians are fully aware that the current situation is flawed, yet many prefer it to an uncertain equilibrium they cannot clearly define.»
The analysis then shifts to what Godong terms the «Bamiléké problem,» referencing Meredith Terretta’s distinction between gung (territory) and lepue (freedom). This, he suggests, fuels an «economic and social Darwinism» among the people of the Grassfields. The result? Kamto is not seen as an alternative political option but as «a sinister figure embodying a diabolical plan.»
Godong also introduces a concept he calls the «syndrome of the self-serving circle,» a variation on Stockholm Syndrome. He describes a system where «everyone is tied to everyone else through minor schemes, each taking a little from the next.» In this model, «winners are those who ‘eat’ (benefit), and losers are those who go hungry.» The conclusion? Whoever assumes power «will have no choice but to act swiftly and decisively—quickly to redistribute wealth and strongly to make economic growth the sole ‘steed.’» Achieving 6% growth, reducing the deficit, and combating corruption are not just priorities; they are urgent necessities.
Ultimately, Godong predicts that Cameroon’s political game «will become less idle and less extractive,» adding that the country needs «a strong, committed Paul Biya to steer it through the post-era.»